Fuel in Southern California
- chaparral: perennial evergreen brush
- one of most flammable plant groups
- can grow shoots from unburnt subsurface roots
- some need heat or smoke to germinate
- eucalyptus in urban areas: native to Australia;
aromatic oils increase fire risk; fast growing; low-quality brittle wood
The Role of El Nino
- strong El Ninos cause above normal annual rainfalls
- the 1997/1998 El Nino was one of the strongest in the century
- unusually late start of the rainy season
- strongest rain March/April, when plants in mountains start growing
- unusually lush vegetation that died in following years
- unusually large amount of fire fuel
Dangerous Weather Condition in Southern California
Santa Ana weather conditions bring high winds and low humidity to Southern California. This weather condition occurs mostly from October
through February and tremendously increases the fire risk in San Diego's back country.
Fire Fighting or Suppression? The Case California
a comparison of fires in California and Baja California also reveals that fire fighting practices
do not decrease the amount of area burnt
- California fights fires at any cost while Baja lets them burn
- in Baja half the area burnt in twice as many fires; i.e. CA fires much bigger
- only 20% of fires in Baja burn after Sep 1 (start of Santa Ana season), while
72% burn in California; i.e. Santa Ana fire risk increased in CA!
- despite fire fighting efforts, number of fires has remained over decades
- size of burnt area declined dramatically; does this increase future fire risk?
- should forests be thinned (increase of shrub growth -> increased fire risk!?)
- should fires be allowed to burn? (could go out of control)
- are prescribed fires the solution? (number is increasing, so is cost)
- WHO PAYS FOR THIS?
What Happened During the Cedar Fire
On Saturday in the late afternoon, a lost hunter lit a fire in the Cleveland National Forest 15km/9mi to the east of the town of Ramona, 15km/9 mi north of I-8. The hunter was rescued and a fire fighting helicopter sighted the fire. But flight regulations did not allow the copter to fight the fire because the copter flew within 30min of sunset. The fire (Cedar Fire) continued to burn in the forest but got whipped out of control by early Sunday morning. Near 9am, the fire spread westward from Lakeside to Scripps Ranch (15 km/9 mi), into the city limits of San Diego, in less than 1h. Later that morning, the fire jumped I-15, a 10-lane freeway and progressed sporadically west, to within 8km/5 mi of the ocean. Apart from the fact that, at this point, this fire was nearly impossible to fight, lack of resources and communication errors between San Diego county and city fire fighting crews added to the unfolding drama. By Sunday night, the fire had spread south from Ramona and jumped I-8 to burn much of the rural community of Crest, a few km east of El Cajon. According to eye witnesses, the evacuation of Crest was particularly chaotic, with conflicting recommendations as to whether residents should leave or not. In Valley Center, a fire was started by arson near the Rincon Casino Resort and spread south. By Sunday 8pm, the news was that these fires burnt 150,000 acres of land, destroyed 220 homes (most of them in Scripps Ranch and a few in Tierrasanta), and killed 11 people. Winds shifted on Sunday and pushed the fires eastward. The Cedar fire eventually burnt an area 50km across, from Scripps Ranch to the Cuyamaka Mountain area, coming close to the historical town of Julian. By Wednesday, the Cedar Fire alone had burnt 250,000 acres, the number of homes destroyed was up to 1533, with 1416 destroyed by the Cedar Fire (incl. 350 at Scripps Ranch, 40 in Poway), and the number of deaths was 16.
Earlier on Sunday, another fire started in the Otay Mesa area (Otay Fire). Since it was not immediately threatening residential areas, it was initially not tended to. It too, burned out of control, charred 45,000 acres and came dangerously close to housing but Otay Lake was in the way and ultimately stopped the spread of the fire.
What Went Wrong on the Weekend of October 26?
preceeding the weekend of the tragic Cedar/Paradise and Otay fires, a number
of factors had dramatically increased the fire risk in San Diego county in recent years:
- 1997/1998 strong El Niño; San Diego received 2-3 times normal rain fall
- succeeding La Niña dried out countryside
- warning that "next 10 years will be dry"
- last 5 years below-average rainfall
- threat of MAJOR wildfires; but did not happen
- 2002 Pines Fire east of Julian (helicopter downed power line) only major fire
- explosive development of city into rural areas (Scripps Ranch faces several chaparral-loaded slopes)
extraordinary circumstances just before the weekend left San Diego practically defenseless
- Red Flag Weather Warning on Oct 24! SANTA ANA!!
- Fires had been burning in Camp Pendleton; Simi Valley; St. Bernardino (Santa Ana clusters fires!)
- California sends fire fighters were they are needed, so S.D. had only few
- a lost hunter is thought to have started the Cedar Fire
- the Cedar fire started near Ramona and the San Diego County Estates and went
quickly out of control
- nature-induced spread: after burning for 6-7h, Santa Ana winds pushed fire out of control;
fire spread west extremely fast (some estimates are > 15mi in less than 1h before it reached
Scripps Ranch early Sunday morning)
- human-induced spread: spread of fire might have been delayed if air support had been allowed to fly closer to sunset; miscommunication between county and city; too few fire fighters; Otay fire initially unattended because it didn't immediately threat homes.
By the end of Sunday, the winds died and shifted. By Monday the fires did no longer threat the city by which time new coverage diminished significantly. The Cedar Fire alone had burned 194,000 acres in the first 31h, 2/3 of the total area burnt in this fire.
The fire had also burned toward the east and was spreading faster after the winds shifted.
The fire became more intense because it now burned into the forest were fuel included trees. The fire had reached Cuyamaca by Wednesday, October 29 - despite a tremedous increase of fire fighting resources - and Sunrise Highway that leads to the the Mount Laguna area a day later. The historic part of Julian was spared but a large fraction of the houses in the area burned. The total area burned was 280,000 acres in the Cedar Fire alone (total of nearly 400,000 acres in all three fires). The worst preceeding fire in terms of acreage burned was the 1971 (or 1970?) Mtn Laguna Fire that destroyed 108,000 acres.
Though the house lost caused tremendous heart ache the city will recover sooner than later,
perhaps just in a few years. The surrounding wildland will need significantly longer. While grass will start to grow this winter season, if it rains enough, estimate are that shrublands need in excess of a decade for full recovery. Wooded areas, such as the Silverwood Wildlife
Sanctuary of the National Audubon Society, will need at least three decades and the forests
in the Cuyamaca area probably longer... an awfully long time in a human lifespan........but
nothing really for Nature.
Summary
- three fires burned in S.D. that weekend, the Cedar (south of Ramona) and Paradise fires (valley center) in the north, and the Otay fire in the south (the later summaries of these fires appeared to be combined as the 'Cedar Fire')
- the Cedar Fire jumped I-15 and burned as far as state routes 805-52 intersection
- large losses in the Cedar fire in Scripps Ranch, Crest and other rural communities, and even Tierrasanta
- extremely fast traveling west on Sunday morning from east across route 67 into Scripps Ranch
- started Saturday before sunset; fast spreading Sunday morning pushes westward spread; wind shifts later that day turned fire toward east and south
- confusion during evacuation, especially in rural communities and when fire entered San Diego city limits
- Otay Fire left burning in unpopulated area, then burned out of control; the city of Chula Vista was lucky when fire stopped at Otay Lakes
- 280,278acres (1,1300 km2) burned, 14 fatalities, incl. 1 fire fighter, 104 firefighter injuries; 1,478 total fire personnel; $27 Mio costs (according to
CDF)
- NB: there was at least 1 additional fatality in the Paradise fire
- 2,232 residences, 22 commercial, 566 outbuildings destroyed, most in Scripps Ranch
- 50,000 people evacuated, according to sheriff's department
- the Cedar Fire started by a fire set by a lost hunter
A summary of the Cedar and Paradise fires was given on Saturday before the 2007 San Diego firestorm that started Sunday, October 21:
Cedar Fire: started Saturday evening, Oct. 25, 2003 [near Ramona]; burned 422 square miles; destroyed 2,400 homes; killed 15 people; largest wildfire in California history. Paradise Fire: began early next morning; burned almost 57,000 acres around Valley Center; destroyed more than 200 homes; killed 2 people
How Can we Avoid this to Happen Again?
Good question! The problem is very complex and there is probably no
perfect solution. If fact, some suggests are impossible to realize, and perhaps
some shouldn't! They include:
suggestions include:
- ice plants everywhere, but not native to San Diego; does not support wildlife; needs a lot of irrigation
- change air support flying rules, but puts firefighters in harm's way!
- better communication between City and County emergency crews
- change California fire fighter exchange rule, but would we suggest the same if the
Cedar Fire had started before the Grand Prix Fire in St. Bernardino?
- better house protection, but no guarantee! some houses were lost despite all the right precautions
- buy more helicopters, but who pays for this? The current sole San Diego fire fighting
helicopter costs $200,000/month; the purchase of one would involve $1.5Mio)
- stop urban sprawl?
- more prescribed fires, but who pays for this? Some fires burn out of control, e.g. Los Alamos 2000! And even some in San Diego county.